MSU research: global scope, local impact

Joseph Arvai, assistant professor of community, agriculture, recreation and resource studies, and Environmental Science and Public Policy faculty

Phone: (517) 353-0694
E-mail: arvai@msu.edu
Profile: www.msu.edu/~sknkwrks/people/people/arvai.html
Lab: www.msu.edu/~sknkwrks/index.html
Affiliate: Decision Research
Photo: hi-res jpg

Arvai will discuss his research at "Numbers and Nerves: Affect and Meaning in Risk Information," a 90-minute symposium co-organized by Daniel Bronstein, professor of community, agriculture, recreation and resource studies. The symposium is scheduled for Feb. 16, 8:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.

Presentation: "When Less Is More: Affect, Preferences, and Low- and High-Risk Options"

Abstract: It is a hot day in the city and John and Jill have a craving for ice cream. When John visits Ice Cream Vendor A, he is presented with eight ounces of ice cream that comes in a 10 ounce cup. The vendor tells him that he can set his own fair price for this cup of ice cream and John offers to pay $1.65. Jill visits a different vendor, Ice Cream Vendor B, and is offered the same opportunity to set a fair price for seven ounces of ice cream, which this time comes in a five ounce cup; Jill offers to pay $2.25. What accounts for this less-is-more effect? Recent research shows that the ease with which the different characteristics of alternatives in a decision problem are used during choice is typically linked to the instinctive and emotional – or, in other words, affective – connection that one can make with them. In this example, the fullness of the ice cream cups appeals clearly to the emotions of the decision maker and is the dominant attribute; the absolute amount of ice cream in ounces does not and is largely ignored by the decision maker. Allowing a third decision maker in this example to evaluate both cups of ice cream at the same time results in a preference reversal with Vendor A now receiving a higher bid. In this case, the third decision maker is able to place the attributes in context, rank them in terms of importance, and use them in their evaluation of the two alternatives, which results in the preference reversal. But what happens when the emotional or affective charge is placed on the context of the decision problem and not the attributes of the alternatives? Examples of this kind of decision include those, like terrorism, where even the mere mention of the problem evokes strong reactions regardless of the risk levels attached to it. In these cases, expected preference reversals are not observed. Both the policy implications of, and possible decision support remedies for, this phenomenon in the realm of consequential risk management decisions – those ranging from environmental management to terrorism – will be discussed.